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IMPLEMENTING VAT IN INDIA :
IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL POLITY
Chanchal Kumar Sharma
Over the last few years, many attempts have been made to implement VAT in
India.  Initially,  all  states  were  to  move  to  VAT  system  by  2000,  but
administrative  problems and  concern  over  the  revenue  implications  of  the
change delayed the scheduled implementation. It has been postponed for five
times in past five years. In fact, introduction of a full fledged VAT in India
seem  to  present  numerous  administrative  and  constitutional  difficulties,
including  the  vexed  question  of  union-state  relations.  In  addition  to  this,
implementing VAT in India in context of economic reforms has paradoxical
dimensions. On one hand economic reforms have led to more decentralization
of expenditure responsibilities which in turn demands more decentralization
of revenue raising powers if fiscal accountability is to be maintained. But on
the other hand the process of implementation of VAT can lead not only to
revenue  loss  for  the  states  but  can  also  steal  away the  states’  autonomy
indicating more centralization.  Thus the need is to develop such a ‘federal
friendly model’ of VAT (along with a suitable compensation package) that
can be implemented in India without compromising federal principles.
Introduction
VAT  has  emerged  as  one  of  the  most  fundamental  component  of  the
ambitious agenda of tax reforms since 1991. Initial renditions of VAT were
evident in the report and recommendations of the Tax Reforms Commission
of 1992.Though the initial  phase of  tax reforms can be said to be crisis
driven in the sense that the economic reforms of which it was a part was
itself  crisis  driven,  the  present  phase  however  intends  to  bring  about
systemic improvements in tax structure. The reforms are aimed at attending
to the necessities of a market economy that India is committed to become.
The agenda is to make the tax system responsive to the requirements of the
international competition.  In fact in the changing global economic scenario,
economy  can  be  kept  competitive  only  by  making  the  tax  system
comprehensive,  broad  based,  simple  and  transparent.  The  concept  of  a
broad based VAT (that theoretically became most favoured form of tax 
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worldwide  during  the  90’s)  promises  to  achieve  these  goals  in  case  of
indirect taxation.  But the process of implementation of VAT is likely to
face constraints in a federal country like India since it entails revenue loss
and loss of autonomy for the sub-central levels. The aim of this paper is to
explore  these  constraints  and  to  give  suggestions  for  making  the
implementation of VAT more federal friendly. 
Present paper is divided into five sections. Section I makes a case for
adopting  VAT  system  in  India  and  highlights  its  repercussions  for  the
sensitive Center-State  relations.   Section II demonstrates how three main
variants  of VAT interact  with the  constraints  imposed by India’s  federal
structure.   Section  III  looks  at  various  attempts  in  direction  of  tax
rationalization  by  the  GOI  that  have  done  away  with  some of  the
constraints.  The  attempts  to  deal  with  the  major  constraints  of
compensation  have  been  separately  dealt  with  in  section  IV.   The
concluding section (Section V) draws attention towards certain rethinking
and prospects for federal polity.  
I
Vat is a fiscal innovation that began tentatively with French sales tax
reform of 1954-55 and spread quickly to cover 130 countries with in just
about  50  years.  VAT  has  gained  so  much  popularity  that  today  it  is
considered as the only good sales tax. VAT is a general tax that applies, in
principle  to  all  commercial  activities  involving  the  production  and
distribution of goods and the provision of services. VAT is assessed and
collected on the value added to goods in each business transaction. Under
this  concept  the  Government  is  paid  tax  on  the  gross  margin  of  each
transaction.   VAT has many positive gains to offer to Indian tax structure.
For  instance,  it  will  eliminate  the  cascading effect  (tax on tax)  of  multi
point taxation associated with the existing sales tax regime. A uniform VAT
rate  will  also  eliminate  competition  among  the  states  to  offer  tax
concessions to attract investment. More specifically, in context of economic
reforms  in  India  it  will  make  sales  between  states  totally  free  thereby
making India a common, integrated market. Each producer  will have a big
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 common market before him. In fact in recent literature (Bird 2000) VAT is
considered  as  the  most  desirable  form  of  tax  from  an  international
perspective especially after global integration of the markets.  But it is to be
noted that VAT has repercussions for the sensitive Center state relations. 
  VAT proposes to replace the sales tax that has conventionally been
considered the best form of ‘regional’ taxation. The traditional literature on
taxation  favours  sales  tax  as  best  source  of  revenue  for  sub  national
governments (for instance, Musgrave 1983) In fact  in India it  is  the only
major revenue source for intermediate level of governments  since low per
capita  income  and  unemployment  render  income  tax  inadequate  as  a
revenue source.
VAT  thus  poses  serious  problem  for  the  finance  of  regional
governments  in  India.  Such  problems  become  more  evident  when  the
context  of  ongoing economic reforms  is  also  taken into  account.  In fact
implementing VAT in India in context of economic reforms has paradoxical
dimensions for Indian federalism. On one hand economic reforms have led
to  more  decentralization  of  expenditure  responsibilities  which  in  turn
demands  more  decentralization  of  revenue  raising  power  if  fiscal
accountability is to be maintained. But on the other hand implementation of
VAT  (to  make  India  a  single  integrated  market)  will  lead  not  only  to
revenue loss  for  the states  but also will  steal  away the  states’  autonomy
indicating more centralization. 
After economic reforms of 1991 expenditure responsibilities  of the
states  vis  a’  vis  center  have  increased.   Thus  to  support  and  sustain
economic reforms, it becomes essential to devolve power for revenues to
the  sub central  levels  if  adequate  fiscal  accountability  and much desired
"Wicksellian connection" (Breton, 1996) is to be maintained. However, the
proposed implementation of VAT (also to support economic reforms) can
do  exactly  the  opposite  ie.  loss  of  revenue  to  the  states. Thus  while
objective  behind  introduction  of  VAT  is  to  eliminate  much  of  the
complexity and associated compliance costs of the current system and also
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to increase  India’s  competitiveness  in the  international  market yet at  the
same time it poses serious problem for the finance of regional governments.
Thus  the  challenge  in  implementation  of  VAT  in  context  of  economic
reforms  is  to  reconcile  the  opposing  forces;  one  forcing  toward
centralization and other towards decentralization. The need is to work out a
variant of VAT that is acceptable to states.
II
A wide  study of  the  experiences  of  different  countries  with  VAT
across  the  globe  shows  that  there  can  be  different  models  of  VAT
depending upon the circumstances prevailing in each country. Theoretically
speaking VAT is mainly of two kinds viz national and sub-national VAT
but  there  are  some  hybrid  types  as  well.  In  this  section  the  federal
constraints in implementing three models namely; (i) the national vat, (ii)
sub-national vat; and, (iii) dual vat have been discussed.
(i) The National Model: 
The  Tax  Reform  Committee  (1992)  chaired  by  Raja  J.  Challiah
suggested the conventional model of vat ( National VAT)   for India. This
was seen as an arrangement that will reduce administrative and compliance
costs.   Conventionally,  National  VAT is  considered  as  an ideal  form of
VAT. It has been argued that VAT operates more successfully as a national
VAT  (McLure  1993,  Tait  1988).  Norregaard  (1997)  states  that  the
requirements needed to operate VAT are generally best met by the central
government. For instance the extensive administrative capability required to
manage  vat is at best a function of the central government. Similarly the
need  to  make  VAT  neutral  with  respect  to  the  spatial  allocation  of
production  and  consumption  and  the  need  to  exercise  extensive  border
control between jurisdictions strengthens the belief that it is appropriate to
assign  value  added  taxes  to  the  central  government.  Tax  Reforms
Committee (TRC) concluded that the ideal solution to India’s   sales   tax 
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problems would be a single  VAT to replace not only the present  federal
sales tax (the Union excise) but also the state sales taxes (which are, for the
most part, imposed at the production level), with the revenue being shared
between the levels of government. 
In fact, a single ‘National VAT’ is of distinct advantage even if all
or some of the proceeds of the tax are to be distributed to the states, either
on  the  basis  of  estimated  consumption  or  on  some formula  basis.  This
approach of intergovernmental transfer may be the best approach to finance
sub-central levels of governments. While the total to be transferred is fixed
as designated share of VAT collections, the amount to be allocated to each
state is determined by a formula laid down by the central government. This
model  is  in  operation  in  Germany.  TRC thus  recommended  a  “German
solution.” But it  is  to be kept in mind that  even in Germany the federal
issues were  not  easily resolved and the formula of revenue sharing with
sub-national  levels  could  not  be  implemented  without  considerable
disagreement. 
In Indian case,  strong regional governments (in the era of coalition
politics  and  regionalization  of  national  politics),  will  make  it  extremely
difficult either to enforce a centrally determined formula or even to arrive at
a mutually agreed tax-sharing formula. The regional governments may also
oppose the said arrangement because they will not be ready to lose control
over  jobs  that  will  become  inevitable  under  single  administration  of
national VAT. The governments will also grudge the loss of revenue due to
loss of power over sales tax, which is the only major source of revenue for
sub-national governments.
Thus federal issues may stand in the way of smooth switchover to a
central VAT in India. As Alan.A.Tait (1988) argues, “(The) system can not
work in a federal system where the states try to retain more discretion over
their  own  exemptions,  rates  and  revenues.”   Thus  the  successful
implementation of VAT (esp the conventional model) in a federal country
lacks theoretical backing. In fact A.A. Tait (1988) concluded in his study
that in a federal system the workability of vat was uncertain. In USA (being 
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a federation  of  States)  VAT has not  been introduced  due to  the  fear  of
Federal Government usurping the States’ power of sales taxation. 
(ii) The Sub-national Model:
It has been argued that the conventional/national model of vat is the
most popular and workable model. (supported by the fact that even some of
the  federal  countries  like Argentina,  Austria,  Germany and Mexico have
chosen  to  adopt  national  model  despite  difficulties  in  resolving  federal
issues).  However,  in  India  where  regional  governments  are  quite  strong
(especially after regionalization of national politics) consensus among states
is a precondition to introduce VAT and more so when it is apprehended that
implementation of vat in context of economic reforms can create problems
for finances of the regional governments in India.
This is the reason behind attempts in India to develop and implement
a model of  VAT that will  not compromise decentralization principles.  In
fact,  Charles  McLure  (2000)  and  Bird  and  Gendron  (1998)  discuss  the
problem of imposition  of  VAT at  two levels  of  government  and  that  of
application of VAT to interstate trade within the same country.  Richard M.
Bird (1999, 2000) argues that the conventional model of tax assignment is
no longer viable because subnational  governments  are increasingly being
asked  to  pick  up  a  larger  portion  of  social  expenditures  on  health  and
education. As a consequence the sub-national VAT is being considered in
context of countries like India with important regional governments.
It has been argued that  in India, sub-national vat would enable the
regional  governments  to  deal  with  the  new  expenditure  responsibilities
shifted to them especially after 1991. It is to be noted that Ip and Mintz
(1992)  in  their  subnational  vat  model  recommended  that  the  Federal
government should turn over all sales taxes to the provinces to reduce the
administrative and compliance costs of taxation and to give more revenue
discretion  to  provinces  and  hence  make  them  more  responsible  for
financing  more  of  their  own  spending  on  health  or  education.  McLure
(2000) also emphasizes the desirability of permitting 
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state  governments  to set  their  own VAT rates.  But  in case  of  India sub
national  VAT  would  pose  problem  as  to  which  state  should  receive
revenues from VAT on imports and which should bear the burden of VAT
refunds on exports. The difficulties associated with the levy of VAT at the
sub-national level can be judged from the experience of Brazil. According
to Norregard, Brazil offers an example of VAT assignment system that is
generally  believed  to  have  had  detrimental  effects  on  economic
performance.  
In fact international experience suggests that the developed and non
federal countries have a better record of smooth transition to VAT. When
VAT is sought to be implemented in a federal state, various problems prop
up pertaining to federalism in general  and fiscal  federalism in particular.
Problems are more severe when the country where VAT is sought  to be
implemented is a developing country in addition to being federal. 
The difficulties associated with the levy of VAT at subnational level
can  be  appreciated  from the  experience  of  Brazil  (a  developing  federal
economy). Shome and Spahn (1996)  Silvani and dos Santos (1996) Serra
and Afonso (1999)  and Versano(2000)  have shown in their studies that
Brazil’s enthusiastic adoption of VAT at two levels had resulted in complex
administrative and technical problems that seemed insurmountable.[Silvani
and  dos  Santos  (1996)  have  suggested  a  ‘German  solution’  for  Brazil].
Norregard (1997) also affirms that  Brazil’s  VAT assignment  system had
detrimental  effects  on  economic  performance.  It  is  to  be  noted  that
subnational  VAT  arrangement  is  quite  unpopular.  Out  of  130  countries
implementing vat, the province of Québec in Canada, the state of Michigan
in USA and Brazilian states are the only examples (of subnational vat) so
far.  Michigan’s VAT being slated to be repealed by 2009 and Brazil being
an  unsuccessful  case  Quebec  is  the  only  successful  experience.  Yet  the
illustrative effect of the Canadian experience has contributed towards the
emergence  of  interest  in  the  theory  of  Subnational  VAT.  This  theory  is
based on the idea of extending the application of VAT to state or provincial
level of the government. 
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It  is  to  be  noted  that  in  case  of  subnational  vat  system  the  most
challenging issue is to find a uniform solution to deal  with cross border
shopping  problems associated  with  taxing sales  at  the  two levels  of  the
government. In VAT arrangement that is envisaged for India by the white
paper,  this  significant  issue  of  ‘how vat  would  be administered  at  State
borders’ has not been addressed. Even the most essential prerequisite for
success of VAT ie elimination of CST has been deferred. CST is levied on
basis of origin and collected by the exporting state; the consumers of the
importing state bear its incidence. CST creates  tax barriers  to integrate the
Indian market  and leads to cascading impact on cost of production. Further,
the denial  of  input  tax credit  on inter-state  sales and inter  state transfers
would affect free flow of goods. 
According  to  the  literature  on  Subnational  VAT,  it  can  be
implemented on the basis of either of the two principles (i) Origin principle
and (ii) Destination principle.
Conventional literature supports implementing a sub national VAT on
origin principle.  Neumark (1963)  states  that  the  only way in  which  sub
national units can effectively levy a VAT was on origin basis. But to avoid
any  distortion  they  have  to  levy  VAT  at  uniform  rates.  This  however
involves a federal  predicament because the above mentioned system can
work only if sub national governments give up their fiscal autonomy. Thus
it defeats the very purpose of the sub national VAT which is to preserve
federal  principle  of  sub  national  autonomy.  Moreover,  if  a  nationally
uniform  VAT  is  administered  by  sub  national  authorities  and  revenues
shared on  the basis of origin as in case of Russian Federation,  then the
same distortions would be created as in the case of non-uniform subnational
origin based VATs (as revealed by Baer, Summers and Sunley 1996). 
The theoretical debate about relevant merits and demerits of the two
principles  of  origin  and  destination,  clearly  converge  in  favour  of  the
destination  principle  [Lockwood,  de  Meza  and  Myles(1994,1995),
Bovenberg (1994), Lopez-Garcia (1996) and Genser (1996)]. 
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The  conditions  needed  to  avoid  distortions  in  efficiency  if  different
jurisdictions levy different rates under the origin principle seem unlikely to
be satisfied in most federal states.  The destination principle on the other
hand  is  not  only  considered  compatible  with  independent  taxation  of
consumption but is also less likely to result in distortions (Keen and Smith
1996).  At present EU applies the destination principle using the ‘deferred
payment method’ (Cnossen and Shoup, 1987). This does not mean that the
destination  principle  solve  all  cross-border  trading  problems,  it  however
helps to diminish the serious ones. R.M. Bird have stated that no one has
yet found any simple  and uniform solution to deal  with all  cross  border
shopping  problems  associated  with  taxing  sales  at  the  two  levels  of
government (Bird 1993). 
In case of India there seems to be only one practical solution for inter-
state  taxation  and  that  is  ‘zero  rating  of  inter-state  sales’.  This  option
envisages reduction of rate of tax under CST, initially to 2% and gradually
to zero percent.
(iii) Dual VAT Model:
In the  report  on “Tax  policy and tax  administration  for  the  Tenth
Plan”  (May  2001)  Dr  Parthsarthy  Shome  recommended  a  national
integrated  Centre-State  VAT  in  parallel  or  dual  format.  Taxonomically
Dual VAT is a type of Subnational VAT where each level sets its own rates
independently (thus retaining autonomy) but on similar bases. The base for
a sub-national VAT system is a well-designed and comprehensive national
VAT. In the dual VAT system, the only VAT rate set centrally is that of the
central  government itself.  According to Bird and Gendron (2000)  in  this
system there is  no need for any ‘central’  edict  with respect to either  the
range or level of state taxes applied to interstate trade since no such taxes
are  applied.  Thus dual VAT approach obviously requires  a central  VAT
(although  perhaps  one  that  collects  no  revenue)  and  some  degree  of
information exchange and co-operation amongst tax authorities. It can be
recalled that way back in 1994 the Government of India appointed a study
group to recommend measures to harmonize and rationalize the domestic 
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 trade tax system in the country. The study group made a thorough analysis
of the distortions of the prevailing system of taxation and recommended the
gradual  moving over to destination based,  consumption type value added
taxes at the state level. At the central level, the study group recommended
complete switching over to the manufacturing stage VAT. At the state level,
the existing sales taxes were to be transformed into retail stage destination
type VAT.  In other  words  development  of  dual  VAT – a manufacturing
stage VAT by the centre and a consumption type destination based retailed
stage VAT by the states was suggested as a solution. NIPFP (1994) also
recommended for a system of ‘independent dual VATs’. State VATs were
to be restricted to the retail stage, with the central VAT being levied only
on  manufacturers.   Bagchi  (1997) suggested  that  the  long-run  solution
should be a concurrent or dual VAT with a nationally-determined base but
independently-set federal and state rates.  The major constraint in case of
India for applicability of a dual vat is that the system works well when there
is a high level of administrative cooperation. It is  difficult  to expect this
model to work as such in India because the extent of improvements required
to  be  made  in  India’s  existing  central  government  sales  tax  before
attempting  any  reform in  subnational  tax  regimes  will  be  enormous,  if
anything similar to this solution is to be implemented. Even otherwise the
quality of administration in India to generate the required extent of mutual
support among the two levels of the government is quite low.  
III.
 Though it has been observed that the TRC recommendation fell short
of developing a coordinated domestic trade tax system in the country (Rao,
2000)  as  it  failed  to  make  a  dent  in  the  independent  and  overlapping
commodity tax  systems at  the  central  and  state  levels,  yet  some healthy
changes have occurred in the tax structure since 1991. For instance there
has been a considerable simplification and rationalization of union excise
duties.  Besides  reduction  in  the  number  of  rates,  the  tax  has  been
progressively converted from a specific into  ad valorem levy in respect of
majority of commodities.  The facility of providing credits on input taxes
under  the  MODVAT  too  has  been  progressively  extended  to  a  larger
number of commodities,  with the budget 2000 taking a quantum leap by
introducing CENVAT.
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Another important change since 1991 is the introduction of a selective tax
on services. The constitution does not assign this tax base specifically either
to  the  centre  or  states.  However,  the  central  government  by  invoking
residuary powers has introduced a tax on services since 1994-95.( After 92nd
Amendment  service  tax  has  been  brought  under  Union  list  of  seventh
schedule) Beginning with three services (telephones, non-life insurance and
stock brokerage), the base of the tax has been broadened to cover a large
number  of  services  such  as  transporters,  car  rentals,  air  travel  agents,
architects,  interior  designers,  management  consultants,  chartered
accountants, cost accountants, company secretaries, credit rating agencies,
market  research  agencies,  underwriters,  private  security/detectives,  real
estate  agencies  and mechanized slaughter  houses.  In budget  2004-05,  13
more services were brought under the net taking the total to 71.
Over the last few years, many attempts have been made to implement
VAT in India.  Initially,  all  states  were to  move to a  VAT by 2000,  but
administrative problems and concern over the revenue implications of the
change delayed the scheduled implementation. Most states, however, began
to  implement  some  of  the  agreed  preliminary  measures,  such  as  the
uniformity  of  “floor  rates”  on  particular  classes  of  goods.  Yet  political
compulsions  impeded  any  further  advancement  in  this  direction  and  the
schedule  for  implementation  of  VAT has  been repeatedly  postponed  for
five times since 1999, the year when all the state governments for the first
time agreed that they would introduce a VAT system to replace the sales tax
structure.
IV.
It can be argued that a major difficulty in evolving a destination based
retail stage VAT at the state level arises from the apprehensions expressed
by  a  number  of  states  about  possible  revenue  losses  in  the  process  of
transition to VAT. 
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Thus the first hurdle is to compute the revenue loss incurred by the states on
basis of an agreed formula and then devise a plan for compensation to the
states. In fact one major reason for revenue loss is the fact that in order to
stabilize VAT, elimination of CST will become inevitable as the two cannot
remain in tandem. Discussions between the states on replacing their sales
taxes by VATs in fact centered to a considerable extent on the issue of what
to do with the CST in order to deal with the inter state trade. Bagchi (1996)
suggested the CST be reduced to 2 percent, with the exporting state keeping
half  the revenue and the  remainder  being pooled  and distributed “on  an
equitable basis” basically to finance a full rebate of the exporter’s tax by the
importing  states.  In  1997  a  committee  of  state  finance  secretaries  also
recommended reduction of  CST by 2 percent, with half the revenues going
to the exporting state and the other half pooled and shared on the basis of
consumption (Poddar 1999). 
The  CST  is  a  major  source  of  revenue  for  the  states,  thus  the
problems arising out of eventual phasing out of the CST will be difficult to
resolve.  State  governments  are  demanding the right  to retain  and in fact
widen the tax net  by levying a range of taxes,  including entry tax.  This
would defeat the fundamental objective of imposing VAT, namely, unifying
and  harmonizing  the  complex  tax  structure  in  the  country.  Thus  the
compensation  issue  is  directly  related  to  the  reluctance  of  the  states  to
pursue tax rationalization sincerely. ‘Revenue’ after all is what matters the
most to the government. As Keen and Smith (2000) have emphasized that
the fate of any possible redesigns of central-state or interstate taxation is
likely to turn on who gains and who loses, and by how much. It won’t be
wrong to  suggest  that  as  a  rule  when fiscal  circumstances  permit  some
compensatory transfers to be made to losers, as was done in Canada, the
level of acceptance of the rational tax system rises.  
As a part of revenue compensation package the states were given the
power to tax AED goods (textiles, tobacco and sugar) in 2002-03 budget.
Earlier,  the  states  merely  received  1.5%  of  the  Central  tax  revenues
distributed  to  them as  suggested  by  Eleventh  Finance  Commission,  for
giving up their right to levy sales tax on the three commodities. There was
no  sales  tax  on  sugar,  tobacco  and  textile  products.  Instead,  the  Centre
levied an 
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additional  excise  duty  (AED)  on  these  items  `in  lieu  of  sales  tax',  the
proceeds of which were meant to be passed on to the States. What the 2003-
04 Budget did was to `empower' States to levy sales tax/value-added tax
(VAT) of up to four per cent on these products, even while the Centre will
continue to impose the AED. Both the levies thus now co-exist. The AED
cannot go because states are given an additional 1.5 per cent of the Centre's
shareable tax revenues, which is their entitlement from the levy as per the
11th Finance Commission's award. 
Service tax has also been used to address the compensation issue. In
India, the states do not have the power to levy tax on services. The states
can  levy sales  taxation  of  only  goods.  Taxation  of  services  before  92nd
Amendment Act, 2003 (passed on 7th January 2004) was not assigned to
either the centre or the state, but the former levied taxes on selected services
based on its power to levy taxes on residual items under `entry 97' of the
Union  List,  which  relates  to  taxes  not  mentioned  in  either  the  State  or
Concurrent  Lists.  After  92nd amendment  service  tax  has  been  brought
explicitly under Union list of seventh schedule. The central government has
tried  to use service  tax  to convince the states  to gradually eliminate  the
taxation on inter-state sales (CST) so that a levy of destination based VAT
becomes a reality.  Thus 92nd Amendment seeks to allow States to `collect'
and `appropriate' taxes on services. Though power to `levy' these taxes, will
remain with the Centre yet the act has given sufficient powers to the State
governments  to  collect  the  proceeds.  In the  Budget  2003-04 the  general
service tax rate was increased from 5 percent to 8 percent in order to allow
the states to appropriate 3 percent of the overall 8 percent service tax and
leave the  rest  to the center.  Budget  2004-05 increased  service tax to  10
percent.  Thus  now  the  overall  position  is  that,  even  after  States  are
empowered to collect and appropriate revenues from three out of the overall
ten per cent service tax rate, they will still be entitled to 29.5 per cent of the
Centre's balance seven per cent collections under this head. For 2003-04,
the Centre budgeted total revenues of Rs 8,000 crore from service tax, of
which Rs 2,360 crore or 29.5 per cent was devolved to the States as per the
11th Finance Commission's formula.
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It is due to such efforts in the past coupled with determination of the
UPA government and assurance for adequate compensation for revenue loss
due to VAT ( if any) and deferring the phasing out of central sales tax,  that
a consensus  among the states  seems to be emerging with all  agreeing to
implement a state level VAT. In order to compensate states for any loss of
revenue while switching over to the new tax regime a three tier package has
been offered, that include 100% compensation for revenue loss in the first
year, 75% in the second and 50% in the third.
But the things cannot be taken for granted as the quantification of the
loss on transition to VAT will be contentious issue. It has been asserted that
the  loss  on transition  to  VAT may not  be  as  high as  is  expected  to  be
projected by the states. It is to be noted that compensation of loss to states
on  transition  to  VAT  will  be  on  agreed  basis  and  agreement  has  yet
remained quite elusive.
V
Keeping  in  view  the  need  for  developing  viable  VAT  model  for
Indian states on one hand and uncertainty on account of past experiences of
repeated postponements of deadlines for implementing VAT, on the other,
certain measures have been suggested by various experts. M.G. Rao states
“Simplification and rationalization of the state  taxes into VAT has to be
calibrated carefully. Rate rationalization, systematic provision of tax credit
on  inputs  and  those  paid  on  previous  stages,  removal  of  competing  tax
incentives  and  concessions,  zero  rating  the  tax on inter-state  sales  –  all
these have to be done in phases. There is also an urgent need to create a
proper  management  and  information  system  and  to  computerize  tax
returns”. [M. Govinda Rao (2000)] Here it would be important to point out
that implementation of VAT in Indonesia and Thailand is a success story. It
can  be  attributed  to  careful  planning  and  the  employment  of  a  simple
system of record keeping, tax rates and tax administration leading to high
compliance levels.  
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The greatest challenge in India is to design a sales tax system that will
provide autonomy to the subnational  levels  to fix  tax rate  in a common
geographical  space,  without  compromising  efficiency  or  creating
enforcement  problems.  In  fact,  political  compulsions  have  led  the
government to propose an imperfect model of VAT that is a unique hotch-
potch.  The VAT system rolled across  India by the white  paper  on State
level VAT is not a true VAT. The rate structure as recommended by the
empowered committee of  state  finance ministers  is  complex.  Though the
white paper claims that CST will be phased out, no exact time period has
been mentioned.  Local or state level taxes like octroi, entry tax, lease tax,
workers  contract  tax,  entertainment  tax and luxury tax are not integrated
into the new regime which goes against the basic premise of VAT which is
to have uniformity in the tax structure. The fact that no tax credit will be
allowed  for  inter-state  trade  seriously  undermines  the  basic  benefit  of
enforcing a vat system, namely the removal of the distortions in movement
of goods across the states.
On January 18th 2005 all national dailies quoted Mr P. Chidambaram
as saying, “It is our dream to move on to GST (Goods and Services Tax) in
future….it  will  be  a  National  VAT  and  the  State  level  VAT  would  be
integrated into it.” Given the political realities and constitutional problems,
this  wishful  thinking  is  likely  to  remain  a  dream for  ever.  This  dream
overlooks  the  fact  India  is  a  federal  country  with  strong  regional
governments (the fact that regional governments shars power at the center
makes them more powerful).
While  devising  a  proper  and  feasible  model  of  VAT  for  India  it
should  be  kept  in  mind  that  one  of  the  major  lessons  of  the  Canadian
experience is simply that there is no need to have single VAT system for
whole country. Respecting the regional differences different provinces can
be allowed to adopt  different  variants  of VAT.  Canada has allowed five
different systems to operate in its ten provinces. This probably answers the
often raised question as to whether by amending the constitution a Central
VAT  (  the  centre  levying   the  VAT  and  sharing  it  with  states)  or  a
Subnational  VAT  (VAT  being  completely  in  state  hands  )   shall  be
followed.
The Indian Journal of Political Science                                                930
Thus it  is  important not to try to formulate a universal and precise
conceptual design leading to elimination of the likelihood of evolution of a
tax policy that will be able to put up with the regional differences thereby
allowing different systems to coexist within same nation. The better part is
that it is functioning well in a federal country like Canada.  This however
does not mean that the system will necessarily work in India too. In fact
differences  in  political  culture,  may  lead  to  certain  difficulties  in
permissibility of such solutions in India. This significant issue, therefore,
calls for further study and investigation in Indian context.
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